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of	 Eastern	 Partnership	 countries	with	 the	 European	Union.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 partner	 countries	 have	 so	 far	 made	 little	
meaningful	progress	in	modernisation,	reforms	or	European	
integration.	 Since	 the	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 was	
launched	 in	 2004,	 the	 situation	 in	 areas	 of	 key	 importance	
for	the	EU,	such	as	democratisation,	free-market	transforma-
tions,	 European	 integration,	 political	 stability	 and	 regional	
security,	 has	 not	 improved	 to	 a	 degree	 that	would	meet	 the	
Union’s	expectations.






































political	 groups	 by	 introducing	 political	 pluralism	 and	 free	
competition.	The	 local	elites,	however,	are	mostly	 interested	
in	defending	their	positions.	
•	 As	 on	many	 other	 issues,	 the	 European	Union	 has	 failed	 to	
develop	a	coherent	position	on	its	policy	towards	the	eastern	
neighbours.	This	applies	both	to	the	long-term	objectives	(cf.	
attitudes	 towards	 membership	 prospects	 for	 EaP	 countries	












•	 The	 policy	 of	 Russia	 poses	 a	 growing	 challenge	 to	 the	 EU’s	
policy	in	the	eastern	neighbourhood.	On	the	one	hand,	this	is	
due	 to	 the	 limited	dynamics	of	EU	actions,	and	on	 the	other	
to	 a	 change	 in	Moscow’s	 strategy.	Russia’s	Eurasian	 integra-
tion	 project	 (of	 which	 the	 customs	 union	with	 Belarus	 and	






















its	 partners	financial	 support	without	preconditions	 related	
to	democratisation	or	economic	transformation.
•	 As	 the	 opportunities	 for	 stepping	 up	 political	 co-operation	
are	 limited,	 we	 should	 not	 expect	 any	 breakthrough	 in	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Eastern	
Partnership	countries.	In	order	to	increase	the	efficacy	of	Eu-
ropean	actions	and	avert	 the	ultimate	 failure	of	 the	Eastern	
Partnership	 initiative,	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 to	 achieve	 some	
tangible	progress,	especially	in	the	three	crucial	areas	of	eco-
nomic	 integration	 (the	 signature	 and	 implementation	 of	 the	
Deep	 And	 Comprehensive	 Free	 Trade	 Agreements,	 increas-





gotiating	 the	 Association	 Agreements,	 stimulating	 reforms)	
the	 EU’s	 economic	 and	 business	 relations	 with	 the	 eastern	
neighbourhood	have	not	intensified	considerably,	nor	has	the	



































in	 particular	 on	 negotiating	 association	 agreements	 and	 agree-
ments	on	visa	 liberalisation	and	 facilitation.	However,	 these	ef-
forts	have	so	far	failed	to	produce	tangible	outcomes	in	the	form	of	
agreements	signed	and	implemented,	nor	have	they	produced	any	












has	 made	 considerable	 progress	 towards	 rapprochement	 with	
the	EU	over	the	last	four	years;	in	October	2012	the	EU	Commis-
sioner	for	Enlargement	Štefan	Füle	said	that	the	country	should	


























From	 their	 point	 of	 view,	what	 the	European	Union	 offers	 does	









everything	 on	 Euro-Atlantic	 integration,	 European	 integration	
is	not	the	only	option	for	the	Eastern	European	states.	Other	ac-
tors,	 including	Russia	 in	particular,	occupy	 important	positions	






























nership	have	brought	 the	Union	closer	 to	achieving	 its	declared	
objectives	in	the	relations	with	eastern	neighbours.	What	is	the	
underlying	 cause	 of	 the	 dwindling	 involvement	 and	 declining	
interest	 in	achieving	real	progress	 in	integration?	How	may	the	
events	 that	have	been	dominating	 the	political	agenda	–	 i.e.	 the	




tives	 and	 assumptions	 of	 the	 European	 Union’s	 eastern	 policy.	
It	then	goes	on	to	discuss	developments	in	the	individual	Eastern	



























I. EvOluTION Of ThE Eu’S aPPrOach  
TO ITS EaSTErN NEIghbOurhOOd






The	first	stage	 in	 the	evolution	of	 the	EU	policy	 instruments	ad-
dressing	 the	 countries	which	 are	now	participating	 in	 the	East-
ern	 Partnership	 consisted	 in	 the	 conclusion	 of	 Partnership	 and	
Co-operation	Agreements	 (PCA),	which	were	signed	with	all	 the	













Policy	 (ENP),	 which	 covered	 the	 sixteen	 countries	 in	 Eastern	
2	 In	the	present	paper,	the	term	“Eastern	Europe”	refers	to	the	countries	par-



















Europe	 and	 the	 Southern	Mediterranean4.	 The	 ENP	 introduced	
a	significant	change	in	the	Union’s	attitude	towards	Eastern	Eu-
rope.	The	EU	started	to	recognise	the	region	as	its	direct	neigh-
bourhood,	 and	 consequently	 it	 became	necessary	 for	 the	Union	
to	 step	 up	 its	 political	 and	 financial	 involvement	 there.	 At	 the	
same	 time,	 a	 separation	 was	 introduced	 in	 EU	 policy	 between	
the	Eastern	European	countries	 and	Russia,	which	did	not	par-
ticipate	in	the	ENP5.	This	meant	a	significant	change	in	the	EU’s	
perception	of	 the	countries	of	 the	region,	which	were	no	 longer	











although	membership	 prospects	were	 not	 ruled	 out.	 The	 scope	






parties	 reached	 agreement	 on	 the	 Partnership	 for	Modernisation,	which	
was	 supposed	 to	 lend	 a	 new	 impulse	 to	 the	 EU-Russia	 relations.	 See	 the	
Joint	Statement	on	 the	Partnership	 for	Modernisation	EU-Russia	Summit	




























3. The Eastern Partnership
Maintaining	a	single	framework	for	the	disparate	neighbourhoods	
in	the	east	and	in	the	south	turned	out	to	be	difficult.	As	a	result,	








also	 intended	 to	 strengthen	 the	 Union’s	 position	 as	 a	 global	 ac-













































nomic	 integration,	 EU	 support	 for	 reforms	 and	modernisations,	
measures	to	strengthen	civil	society,	etc.).	In	doing	so,	the	EU	tried	
to	avoid	problems	that	could	obstruct	 the	 implementation	of	 the	









influenced	 the	 Union’s	 decision	 to	 launch	 the	 Eastern	 Partner-
ship.	The	‘Arab	spring’	in	early	2011	and	the	toppling	of	regimes	in	
Tunisia,	Egypt	and	Libya,	as	well	as	the	protests	in	the	other	coun-
tries	 of	 Northern	 Africa,	 fundamentally	 changed	 the	 political	

















policies	 towards	 the	neighbours.	Those	 events	 called	 into	ques-
tion	 the	EU’s	original	approach	 to	 the	southern	neighbourhood,	
where	 the	priority	had	been	 to	ensure	stability	and	security	by	
co-operating	with	the	local	authoritarian	regimes	at	the	expense	














Still,	 the	 Union	 has	 been	 largely	 reactive	 in	 implementing	 its	





































eastern	 neighbourhood	 became	 even	 more	 pre-eminent	 when	





regional	 security,	 democratic	 and	 free-market	 transformations,	
and	integration	with	the	EU,	the	situation	in	the	countries	of	the	
region	has	not	changed	considerably,	and	has	worsened	in	some	
respects.	 Analysis	 of	 the	 various	 criteria	 and	 indexes	 describ-
ing	the	change	in	those	areas	since	2004	shows	that	the	growing	










Eastweek,	 Centre	 for	Eastern	Studies,	 30	May	 2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-05-30/eurovision-azerbaijan-s-failure-to-
promote-itself




















neighbourhood,	 revealing	 the	 limits	of	 the	EU’s	 ability	 to	 influ-
ence	the	situation	in	the	EaP	countries.	
1. Democracy and regional security
None	of	the	six	EaP	countries	are	democratic	states	by	European	
standards.	According	to	various	rankings,	they	are	either	partly	
democratic	 (Moldova,	 Ukraine,	 Georgia,	 Armenia)	 or	 authori-
tarian	 regimes	 (Belarus	 and	Azerbaijan).	None	 of	 the	 countries	
have	 reported	 considerable	 improvement	 in	 this	 respect	 since	
2004,	and	in	most	of	them	the	situation	has	hardly	changed	at	all.	
Ukraine,	 where	 the	 situation	 deteriorated	 markedly	 after	 2010	




















2006 2008 2010 2011 2012

















































country freedom in the world(1 = free – 7 = not free)






















armenia 4 4 PF 5↓ 4 PF 6↓ 4 PF 6 4 PF 6 4 PF 5↑ 4
azerbaijan 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5
belarus 6 6 NF 7↓ 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6
georgia 4 4 PF 3↑ 3↑ PF 4↓ 4↓ PF 4 3↑ PF 4 3 PF 3↑ 3
Moldova 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 4↓ PF 3↑ 3↑ PF 3 3 PF 3 3
ukraine 4 4 F 3↑ 2↑ F 3 2 PF 3 3↓ PF 4↓ 3 PF 4 3
PR	–	political	rights	 	 F	–	free	 	 	 NF	–	not	free
































as	 free,	 despite	 some	 shortcomings13.	The	 situation	has	 also	 im-
proved	noticeably	in	Moldova,	where	the	OSCE	positively	assessed	
the	last	parliamentary	elections	in	201014	and	commended	it	as	an	




























16	 Lawrence	Sheets,	A	‘Frozen	Conflict’	That	Could	Boil	Over,	The International 
Herald Tribune,	8	March	2012.	

















































incident,	 see	Evgeniy	 Sholar,	Nikolai	 Pakholnitsky,	Tatiana	Gyska,	Voen-
naya	gra		«Varnitsa»,	Kommersant Moldova,	27	April	2013,	http://www.kom-
mersant.md/node/16593).
19	 Wojciech	 Konończuk,	Witold	 Rodkiewicz,	 Could	 Transnistria	 block	Mol-
































The	 Bertelsmann	 Foundation	 Transformation	 Index,	 which	
measures	the	condition	of	democracy	and	the	progress	of	market	
economy	reforms,	points	to	two	positive	examples	of	Moldova	and	
Georgia,	 the	 two	countries	 that	did	make	considerable	progress	






election,	 among	 other	 factors20)	 and	 in	 Ukraine	 (which	 experi-
enced	a	relapse	after	the	success	of	the	2004	Orange	Revolution).	
20	 For	more	information	see	International	Crisis	Group,	Armenia:	Picking	up	





























































































 (0.000 worst score – 1.000 best score)
/ position in ranking
year 2005 2010 2011 2012
armenia 0.775	/	83 0.695	/	76 0.716	/	86 0.729	/	87
azerbaijan 0.746	/	98 0.713	/	67 0.700	/	91 0.734	/	82
belarus 0.804	/	64 0.732	/	61 0.756	/	65 0.793	/	50
georgia 0.754	/	96 0.698	/	74 0.733	/	75 0.745	/	72
Moldova 0.708	/	111 0.623	/	99 0.649	/	111 0.660	/	113






















































reported	 little	 improvement	 of	 their	 development	 indexes.	 The	




Index of economic freedom
 (heritage foundation & Wall Street Journal)
 (0 worst score – 100 best score)/position in ranking
year 2004 2007 2009 2011 2012 2013
armenia 70.3	/	23 68.6	/	34 69.8	/	31 69.7	/	36 68.8	/	39 69.4	/	38
azerbaijan 53.4	/	116 54.6	/	111 57.9	/	97 59.7	/	91 58.9	/	91 59.7	/	87
belarus 43.1	/	146 47.0	/	144 44.9	/	167 47.9	/	155 49.0	/	153 48.0	/	153
georgia 58.9	/	78 69.3	/	30 69.7	/	32 70.4	/	28 69.4	/	34 72.2	/	21
Moldova 57.1	/	93 58.7	/	83 54.8	/	120 55.7	/	120 54.4	/	124 55.5	/	115
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3. Economic integration with the EU
The	EU’s	efforts	to	develop	relations	with	the	eastern	neighbour-
hood	have	not	resulted	in	closer	economic	integration	either.	De-
spite	 the	measures	 taken	to	remove	barriers	 to	 trade	exchange,	
and	the	overall	increase	in	the	volume	of	trade,	the	Union’s	share	
























































































































III. ThE ParTNErS’ PErcEPTIONS Of WhaT  








ner	 countries,	 the	 ENP	 and	 the	 EaP	 are	 primarily	 instruments	










1. European integration and the partners’ interests
The	European	Neighbourhood	Policy	and	the	Eastern	Partnership	



















































is	 leading	 to	 growing	 rivalry	 between	 them,	 and	 is	 forcing	 the	
EaP	countries	to	choose	their	 integration	models	and	directions.	


























preferences,	 economic	 subsidies,	 political	 support,	 etc.).	 At	 the	
same	time,	because	of	their	heavy	economic	and	political	depend-




counteract	 its	 closer	 integration	with	 the	EU	 structures.	 For	 in-
stance,	the	Russian	government	has	already	threatened	to	restrict	
Ukraine’s	 access	 to	 the	 Russian	market	 if	 the	 country	 signs	 the	








have	 talked	 about	 the	 benefits,	 and	 also	 about	 the	 difficulties,	 that	may	
arise	and	are	already	arising	in	the	countries	which	are	not	members	of	
the	 Customs	Union.	 This	 is	 life;	 if	 you	 are	 a	member	 of	 an	 internation-
al	 structure,	you	get	specific	privileges.	 If	you	opt	out,	you	can	run	 into	

















































Western	Balkan	 countries’	 commitment	 to	 the	process	 of	Euro-
pean	integration26.
2. Bureaucrats’ offers vs. politicians’ interests




























Because	of	 the	discrepancy	between	 the	 stated	objectives	 of	 in-
tegration	and	 the	 timeframes	 in	which	 they	are	 supposed	 to	be	
achieved	(a	dozen	years	or	more)	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	cur-




the	 political	 will	 to	 achieve	 real	 progress.	 Any	 stimulus	 to	 re-
form	comes	not	from	the	idea	of	rapprochement	with	the	Union,	









the	Union.	 Ukraine’s	 co-operation	with	 the	 IMF	 after	 the	 2009	





27	 See:	 Sławomir	Matuszak,	 Arkadiusz	 Sarna,	 From	 stabilisation	 to	 stagna-
tion.	Viktor	Yanukovych’s	reforms,	Point	of	View,	Centre	for	Eastern	Stud-

































Firstly,	 the	 political	 elites	 are	 interested	 mainly	 in	 defending	
their	own	positions	within	the	existing	system	of	power,	which	
ensures	business	influence	for	them.	As	a	result,	they	seek	to	keep	






in	 the	 other	 countries,	 where	 power	 and	 business	 assets	 have	
been	divided	up	among	a	closed	political	class.	























new	opportunities	 for	 them,	 including	 access	 to	 the	EU	market	



















Iv. dIffErENcES WIThIN ThE Eu
Apart	from	the	obvious	differences	between	the	individual	part-
ner	countries’	relations	with	the	European	Union,	there	are	also	
differences	 within	 the	 Union,	 as	 its	 members	 have	 not	 taken	
a	uniform	position	on	 the	eastern	policy.	Those	differences	be-
tween	 the	 various	 players	 in	 the	 EU,	 the	 institutions	 and	 the	
member	states,	have	come	to	the	foreground	as	a	result	of	mount-
ing	 internal	 problems,	 including	 the	 dispute	 over	 the	 future	
shape	of	the	EU,	the	financial	crisis	and	instability	in	the	south-
ern	neighbourhood.	While	there	is	consensus	on	the	general	ob-
jectives	 of	 the	 neighbourhood	 policy,	 positions	 on	 the	 detailed	
issues	 differ	 according	 to	 the	 individual	 actors’	 interests	 and	
political	aims.	Currently,	three	issues	are	key:	(1)	the	signature	
of	 the	 Association	 Agreements	 and	 the	 Deep	 And	 Comprehen-
sive	Free	Trade	Agreements	(DCFTAs),	especially	with	Ukraine;	
(2)	visa	 liberalisation	and	the	shape	of	migration	policy;	(3)	 the	
scale	 of	 EU	 involvement	 in	 the	 eastern	 neighbourhood.	 At	 the	
core	of	the	differences	of	positions	on	these	issues	are	different	
perceptions	 of	 the	 ultimate	 objective	 of	 European	 integration,	
and	 the	 related	 question	 about	 attitudes	 towards	 granting	 the	
partner	states	prospects	of	membership.
In	view	of	 the	existing	differences,	 the	EU’s	policy	 is	a	compro-
mise	based	on	the	lowest	common	denominator.	As	the	long-term	
strategic	objective	of	 the	neighbourhood	policy	 (membership	 in	























1. Attitude towards the Association Agreement with Ukraine
With	regard	to	the	Association	Agreements	and	the	DCFTAs,	the	
differences	in	the	individual	EU	members’	attitudes	are	due	to	the	












Those	 differences	 have	 become	 most	 prominent	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Ukraine,	 and	 the	 EU’s	 decision	 to	 suspend	 the	 signature	 of	 the	










29	 Štefan	 Füle,	 Speech	 at	 the	meeting	 of	 the	EU-Ukraine	Parliamentary	Co-




















organisations	 argued	 that	 the	 agreements	 should	not	 be	 signed,	
pointing	in	the	first	place	to	the	need	to	stand	up	for	human	rights,	
which	is	regarded	as	a	cornerstone	of	EU	policies.	From	this	point	
of	view,	 it	 important	 for	 the	EU	to	save	 face	and	respond	appro-
priately	to	the	fact	that	Kyiv	had	ignored	its	calls	to	respect	demo-
cratic	 standards.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	advocates	of	 signature,	










































2. Attitudes towards visa liberalisation












to	 stimulate	 bottom-up	 transformations	 through	 co-operation	









Group,	 the	 Baltic	 States	 and	 Romania,	 while	 Germany,	 France,	









































States	 and	 other	 strategic	 partners	 such	 as	 India,	 China,	 Japan,	































for	 funds	 to	 be	 transferred	 from	 the	 eastern	 neighbourhood	 to	
the	southern	dimension,	is	a	case	in	point34.	Event	though	in	suc-
cessive	 documents	 the	 European	 Commission	 tried	 to	 present	
a	picture	of	balanced	involvement	in	both	areas,	the	changes	im-
plemented	as	a	result	of	the	ENP	review	and	the	actions	actually	





























v. challENgES fOr Eu POlIcY
In	the	current	political	and	economic	situation	in	Europe,	three	
processes	will	have	the	greatest	impact	on	the	future	of	the	Un-











Over	 the	 last	 two	years,	 the	EaP	 countries	have	been	gradually	
making	up	for	 the	 losses	 incurred	as	a	result	of	 the	2009	crisis,	
but	 the	new	wave	of	 the	financial	 crisis	 in	Europe	has	 subdued	
growth.	Slower	economic	growth	has	been	reported	everywhere	
except	Armenia	 and	Georgia36.	Moreover,	 all	 the	 partner	 coun-
tries	apart	from	Azerbaijan	and	Belarus	have	seen	their	foreign	






























balance in uS$bln 





armenia 7.2% 2.6% -	2.55	/	26.3% no	data
azerbaijan 2.2% 1.1% +22.58	/	32.8% BBB-
belarus 1.5% 59.2%	 +0.2	/	0.3% B-	
georgia 7.5% -0.3% -5.47	/	36.2% BB-
Moldova -0.8% 4.6% -3.05	/	43,5% no	data










is	 a	 case	 in	point;	 in	2012	 several	 large	European	banks	 includ-
ing	Erste	Bank,	Commerzbank,	Swedbank,	Société	Générale,	SEB	








































































EU	member	 states	 interested	 in	 the	EaP	 region,	which	hitherto	
have	been	actively	stimulating	EU	activities	in	the	eastern	neigh-









than	 full	membership	does	 today,	and	 the	benefits	 that	 the	EaP	
countries	 could	 reap	 from	membership	 would	 be	 limited.	 That	




3. The Eurasian Union
The	 fact	 that	 the	 European	Union	 is	 currently	 unprepared	 and	
lacks	 the	 political	will	 to	 deepen	 real	 integration	with	 its	 east-
ern	 partners	 is	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 Russia.	 In	 2009	Rus-
sia	 launched	its	own	project	for	Eurasian	integration,	conceived	





to	Russia’s	 policy.	 Importantly,	Russia’s	 project	 is	 now	based	 on	




























but	 also	 the	 feasibility	 of	 negotiating	 an	 association	 agreement	
(especially	concerning	the	chapters	on	economic	co-operation)39.	












Russia	 has	 been	 focused	 on	 lobbying	 and	 pressuring	 Ukraine	
and	Moldova,	 the	 two	 countries	most	 committed	 to	 rapproche-
ment	with	the	European	Union,	to	join	the	Eurasian	Union.	The	
choice	to	be	made	by	Ukraine,	the	largest	country	and	the	biggest	


















partners)	will	be	decisive	 for	 the	success	of	 the	 two	 integration	
projects.	 For	 now,	 continuing	 the	 policy	 of	 balance	 in	 relations	
with	the	European	Union	and	Russia	has	become	an	increasingly	
















































1. Limitations of the European Union’s eastern policy











union has failed to become an agent of change in the region to 







The parties involved are interested in maintaining dialogue 


























currently, a breakthrough in mutual relations seems unlike-
ly to happen in the short term.	The	EU	will	not	reform	its	policy	
towards	the	neighbours	until	it	has	solved	its	internal	problems	






Nor	 are	 the	partner	 countries	 likely	 to	make	major	progress	 in	
implementing	internal	transformations,	which	could	potentially	
be	an	impulse	for	the	EU	to	become	more	involved	in	the	region.	




political	 integration	 does	 not	 seem	 feasible,	 actions	 within	 the	
framework	of	the	Eastern	Partnership	will	focus	on	bureaucratic	
measures	and	the	negotiations	of	individual	agreements	(Associa-
tion	Agreements/DCFTA,	 visa	 liberalisation	deals),	 and	 sectoral	
co-operation	in	those	areas	in	which	the	EU	and	the	partners	have	
shared	interests.









































1) Intensification of concrete actions that can produce tangible out-
comes in a short time 

































ample,	with	 regard	 to	 visa	 liberalisation,	 the	 partner	 countries	
should	be	 granted	 considerable	 facilitations	 (such	as	 abolishing	
visa	 charges,	 or	 considerably	 simplifying	 visa	 issuance	 proce-
dures)	upon	completing	 the	first	phase	of	 their	plan	of	 action43.	
The	same	should	apply	to	other	elements	of	the	Union’s	activities,	
including	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Association	 Agreements,	
association	agendas,	etc.	At	the	same	time,	the	EU	should	to	the	




2) Focus on key issues and adjusting objectives and actions to the cur-
rent capacity of the EU and its partners













































3) Creation of an EU investment fund
There	are	at	least	two	arguments	for	making	the	creation	of	such	










cal	 clout,	 but	because	 of	 its	financial	 capacity,	new	 technologies	
and	the	potential	 it	offers	 for	business	co-operation.	The	actions	
taken	 so	 far	 in	 this	 area,	 including	 the	 negotiations	 concerning	
the	 Association	 Agreements	 and	 the	 DCFTAs,	 and	 the	 creation	
of	instruments	to	support	business	and	investments	(such	as	the	




















lem	 in	 this	 regard	 concerns	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 partner	 countries’	








jects	 in	 the	 partner	 countries,	 ranging	 from	 micro-projects	 to	
large	 investments	 spread	 over	 several	 years.	 Furthermore,	 the	
fund	could	finance	projects	from	different	areas	and	sectors	of	the	
economy.	 Its	 activities	 could	 extend	 to	 infrastructural	 projects,	
undertakings	in	the	private	equity	and	venture	capital	markets,	
and	 business-incubator	 activities.	 The	 fund	would	 not	 only	 in-







transformations	 and	 economic	 development.	 Secondly,	 it	would	
be	more	effective	than	the	instruments	used	hitherto	in	promot-





















economies.	 Finally,	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 fund	would	 financially	
benefit	all	 sides	 (investors	 from	the	EU	countries	and	entrepre-
neurs	 from	 the	 partner	 countries),	while	 the	 partner	 countries	
would	gain	additionally	from	the	transfer	of	business	know-how	
and	 new	 technologies.	 The	 fund	 could	 also	 stimulate	 market-
oriented	institutional	and	legal	changes	in	the	EaP	countries.	Its	
profits	could	be	used	to	finance	new	business	projects	in	the	east-
ern	neighbourhood,	which	 in	 the	 longer	 term	would	reduce	 the	
cost	of	the	Union’s	financial	assistance.	
The	creation	of	this	kind	of	instrument	would	strengthen	the	EU’s	
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